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Romer Cornejo*
Political Participation and
Challenges of New Democracies: 
Remarks on China and Taiwan
sEVERAL AUThoRs hAVE NoTiCED the relationship between the 
internationalization (or the globalization) of the economy of a country 
with its democratization as an inevitable process. Nonetheless we can 
find important variations in this relationship that show, as in China, 
that there is not an inevitable relationship between economic liberal-
ism and democracy. in the contemporary changing process in China 
towards an increased local electoral participation of citizens, not to be 
considered as democratization, the endogenous factors along with the 
prevailing of the authoritarian state weigh more. on the other hand, 
in Taiwan, the democratic process can be linked to the search for in-
ternational legitimacy. Additionally it is important to consider the 
presence of a political and intellectual elite, educated in Europe and 
the UsA that is strongly imbued in western democratic values, which 
has been in power since the early 90s. We are taken by these instances 
to the various forms that a political system can adopt with citizen par-
ticipation, as Levitsky and Way have studied through applying several 
adjectives to democracy, marked by authoritarian traces, or through 
* Professor in Contemporary history of China and researcher of the Asia and Africa 
studies Center at The Mexico school. he is on the Editorial Advisory board of Estu-
dios de Asia y Africa magazine. he published several articles and books about China 
and its relationship with Latin America.
201
Globalization and the Washington Consensus
202
authoritarianism with some forms of political participation (Levitsky 
and Way, 2002, Pershing, 2004). The case of Taiwan leads us to the 
well known debate between procedural democracy and its efficiency 
in terms of its consequences as studied by Amartya sen (sen, 1995).
The role of local elections in China
The changes in the Chinese political system during the reforms can 
be summarized as the transition from a totalitarian regime to a single 
party authoritarianism. This last form has required to decentralize 
decisions and to introduce innovative ways of political participation.
in order to understand the political changes in China, it is neces-
sary to consider first that as a result of the reforms, the complexity of 
the society has grown at great speed in the last twenty five years, in such 
a way that, today, roughly speaking, we find a well educated intellectual 
elite raised in the most sophisticated worldly thought trends, trauma-
tized by the Tiananmen repression in 1989, alienated by its privileges, 
not willing to risk its status, co-existing with a rich middle-class which 
accepts that itself is a by product of the authoritarian and developmen-
tal regime and because of that is also unwilling to risks its favorable 
circumstances. They are in a melting pot along with a wide majority of 
farmers and urban population strongly oriented to the satisfaction of 
their own basic needs; with a group of internal migrant workers that is 
more than ten per cent of the population, excluded from development; 
with a middle stratus of cadres from the Communist Party that use 
their power to get material profit from the new conditions; and all of 
them led by a political elite that not only searches to preserve its power 
through the Party but that requires specific instruments of governabil-
ity and legitimacy to guarantee the feasibility of the political system.
in terms of space there is an important sector of the population 
living in the urban communities of the oriental coast with high income 
and a cosmopolitan and consumerist culture coexisting with the ma-
jority of the population living with little resources and difficult infor-
mation access in the broad central and western areas of the country. 
There is also a great diversity of ethnic groups in the scarcely popu-
lated extensive south-west, extreme west, and center north territories, 
which have different ways for relating to space, economy and politics.
The study of the actual Chinese political system reveals that while 
the political elite acknowledges that the country’s severe inequality and 
corruption problems can be a real threat to governability, that elite is 
also forewarned by its own origin and nature to respond to this chal-
lenges within an authoritarian and single party frame. in order to face 
this situation, the new leadership has resorted, at least in the discourse, 
to instruments such as surveying functionaries and transparency and 
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has been using terms such as democracy and rule of law. however, 
the political elite has been clear about this matter: it moves within 
the frame provided by preserving the hegemonic position of the Com-
munist Party, which is endorsed by the Constitution and other related 
Laws. in other words, the defense of the rule of law in China means the 
confirmation of the predominance of the Communist Party. 
Therefore, these changes in the political discourse cannot be ana-
lyzed under the same lens as the meaning of the rule of law in other 
countries; instead, it has to be examined as an instrumental use of 
mechanisms that have been traditionally linked to democratic systems 
to help the survival of an authoritarian regime. in bringing together 
all these paradoxical elements we can search for the goal of citizen 
participation through voting in the local congress elections.
The first element that catches our attention from the new leader-
ship discourse is their stress on the great problems of the country that 
are no longer submitted as contradictions but as imbalances. Those 
submitted more frequently are: the inequalities in income and pover-
ty, the regional inequity in development, corruption and the excessive 
resource waste which is associated with environmental damage. 
one of the more interesting issues of the political change in China 
is the direct elections in the lower levels of the government structure. 
Though those changes were already in 1982’s Constitution they be-
came relevant from the mid 90’s onward. besides their inclusion in the 
Constitution, the direct elections in China are supported by two im-
portant legal instruments. The elections for the National People’s Con-
gress and the People’s Congresses of the lower levels are regulated by 
the Election Law of 1979. The direct elected village committees were 
regulated first by the organic Law on Village Committees approved 
provisionally by the standing Committee of the six National People’s 
Congress on November 24th, 1987. This Law was amended later and 
approved in its definitive form on November 4th, 1998 in the Fifth ses-
sion of the standing Committee of the Xi National People Congress.
As a result there are several kinds of direct elections: the village 
committees, the people’s congresses of townships and counties, the 
neighborhood committees and the popular assembly of districts and 
urban districts. These processes are also ruled by local regulations 
where the provinces have worked on them. in general terms these 
elections must follow the popularity principles, i.e. that all the legal 
age people can vote; equality, direct elections, secret ballots, multiple 
candidates, guarantee the right to vote and the supervision and recall 
of the chosen ones.
The urban equivalent of the village committees are the residents 
or neighborhood committees (chengshi jumin weiyuanhui) which go 
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back to 1954 when they were established to organize the urban resi-
dents that were not affiliated to a working unit. The law for urban 
elections was approved in1989 and it was based on the experimental 
law of the village committees. since 1999, the direct elections of these 
city-dweller committees have been in effect, when the Ministry of Civil 
Affaires selected and then the Party approved the experiment with a 
group of cities among which were beijing, Nanjing and Chongqing. 
in cities with high unemployment and where urban transformations 
have changed –in some cases violently– the way of living of its inhabit-
ants, these elections channeled the dissatisfaction.
since the village elections were implemented, two positions 
arose in the party, on one side, the middle and lower cadres were 
against the law because it undermined the roots of their power; on 
the other side the leaders at of the central power of the party de-
fended the law as an instrument for recovering of legitimacy among 
the people, which could be read as the ideological commandment of 
“masses line”.
however, in practice, it was more relevant to maintain political 
control, avoid the popular unrest caused by the local authorities’ abus-
es, and to guarantee the country governability. That is why, during 
the first period, the lower cadres of the party tried to grasp most of 
the village election positions, frequently using unlawful practices and 
causing local political tensions expressed in countless peasant protest 
movements.
The legitimacy crisis that followed the 1989 repression made the 
party leadership devoted to a big campaign to promote the rule of law 
which was systematized in the mid 90s. During this process the lead-
ership reached an important consensus on governability, stability and 
unity of the country. 
Given the aforementioned circumstances as well as its need for re-
newal and legitimacy, the Communist Party, after a thorough analysis 
of the situation, took a new position, which was posted in a document 
in July 2002. This document clarifies to the members of the party that 
they must respect the electoral laws and avoid imposing their own 
candidates. The document says; 
it is advocated that candidates for secretaries of party branches shall 
run for village committee election first; after they obtain the approval 
from the people, they can be nominated as candidates for secretar-
ies of party branches; should they fail to be elected head of village 
committees, they shall not be nominated as candidates for secretaries 
of party branches. Members of village committee can hold a concur-
rent post in party branches after s/he is approved by the inner-Party 
election. Members of village committees and village group leaders and 
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representatives of villagers can be admitted into the Party in order to 
infuse rural basic-level party organizations with new blood (Circular 
concerning improving villager committee election, 2002).
Direct elections in Chinese countryside have been observed by local 
and foreign Non Government organizations and have been managed 
by the Ministry of Civil Affairs whose educational work is highly and 
widely recognized. however, the majority of these elections don’t fol-
low the law closely, but surveillance along with education has slowly 
shown their effect. 
Meanwhile, in big cities like beijing, these local elections have 
taken independent defenders of popular causes to local congress, and 
in some places local entrepreneurs have won elections to local rep-
resentation. A noteworthy case was when Wang Youhua, brother of 
the former Tiananmen democracy activist and founder of the Chinese 
Democratic Party, Wang Youcai, was pressured by local government 
officials to withdraw his candidacy for the village chief elections in 
Liwu village committee in the east coast province of Zhejiang. (Asia 
Times, May 25, 2005) Through these examples we can state that the 
emphasis on the law and on the institutional reforms, such as local 
elections, can be mechanisms for a small change within the political 
practices and culture of the country. 
During 2005 there were more than 300,000 local direct elections 
for village committees in 15 provinces, municipalities and autono-
mous regions. since 1988 when the provisional organic Law for Vil-
lage Committee was approved there have been elections in the majori-
ty of the provinces and autonomous regions of the country. Up to 2005 
more than 700,000 elected village committees had been established. 
Even though the law has been interpreted locally in many ways, these 
elections involve open nominations, secret ballots and more candi-
dates than positions. According to the international observing agen-
cies the first urban elections have been mainly free and transparent.
since 1999 more than a dozen main cities have been selected to 
carry out direct elections of the neighborhood committees, the lowest 
level of municipal government. in 2005, after several experiments, the 
government decided to increase the number of cities that hold elections 
to choose their representatives in the local congresses. Among others 
these elections have taken place in beijing, shangyang, Nanning, Tian-
jin, Nanjing, Wuhan, harbin, Jinan, Changsha, Yinchuan y Ningbo.
it is remarkable that in some cities even foreigners have been can-
didates as was the case in Pudong or the Taiwanese entrepreneur who 
contested representation in the local congress of Tianjin (People’s Daily, 
october 23, 2005) in the same way experiments in consulting and trans-
parency were registered in some Guandong districts, where officials 
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have began publishing their budgets and employment policies. in 2003, 
in a district of Jiangsu, the local authorities held a public referendum 
so the residents could choose the worst official in each administrative 
department. As a result nine officials were suspended for six months.
it could not be said that the electoral laws are accurately enforced, 
in theory the elections are open and their limit is the formation of po-
litical organizations, the candidates must only represent the interests 
of their communities. one of the main problems of these elections is 
illegal vote induction. in this regard, Zhan Chengfu, director of the 
department in charge of the administration of the basic level of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs said: 
There is only one article dealing with the problem in the existing “or-
ganizational Law for Villager’s Committee” and moreover it is in prin-
ciple singular and vague in sense. There’s no definition on what is a 
bribed vote, nor is there any definite rule as regards how to deal with 
the problem and so it is somewhat difficult to handle the problem. 
Now what we can do is only to work out some rules and regulations on 
the basis as a related department, which can be used by local admin-
istration for reference. When these rules or regulations are testified to 
be correct and suitable in practice they can be taken as amendments 
for legislation. This is an accumulative process in the construction of a 
system (People’s Daily, 2005)1.
Many scholars have interpreted the opening of the political system in 
China as an after effect of globalization. From my personal point of 
view, the local elections are an instrument that the authoritarian elite 
utilizes to face the generalized discontent of the population –resulting 
from the corruption of local officials– which threatens governability. 
in 2005 there were 87,000 officially reported “mass incidents”, which 
are in fact social protest movements. The factors that caused these 
changes appear to be completely endogenous and the Chinese elite 
confirms it. During an important political meeting to commemorate 
the 50th anniversary of the National People’s Congress, the President 
and General secretary of the Communist Party, hu Jintao stated “…
history proves that blindly following western political systems would 
lead China to a dead end, and China’s current people’s congress system 
has strong vitality and great superiority”. The President also said:
We must be active in learning from all human civilizations, includ-
ing the positive results of political civilization. but we will never 
1 About the legal problems of elections see also <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/
zm/20050202/xw/tb/200502030042.asp>.
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blindly copy the mode of other countries’ political systems (People’s 
Daily, 2004). 
Nature and challenges of the new
democracy in Taiwan
Taiwan requires a closer analysis because, from an institutional point 
of view, its democratic liberal system has been recognised worldwide as 
one of the most democratic countries. This process began with the end 
of Martial Law in 1987; however, the political opening can be traced 
back to 1972. in that year, the only party dictatorship of the kuomintang, 
presented signs of opening alternated with ferocious acts of repression. 
These first political changes occurred as an answer to Taiwan’s diplo-
matic isolation after being expelled from the United Nations in 1971. 
This international event undermined the position of the authoritarian 
government; from that moment on, and with growing intensity, some 
of the social forces began to express themselves such as: human and 
women rights or even early worker and student movements.
The death of Chiang kai-shek in 1975 and, three years later, the 
rise to the presidency of his son Chiang Ching-kuo who was more lib-
eral took place precisely when the pressure of the opposition groups 
was growing. on January first of 1979 another international event in-
tensified the problems: the UsA diplomatic recognition shifted from 
Taiwan to the People Republic of China, which meant another hard 
blow to the stability of the Taiwanese state. in December, some civilian 
groups led wide mass meetings in kaohsiung, the second city on the 
island, that were followed by a brutal police repression. by the early 
eighties the existence of the group called tangwai was already evident; 
these were organisations outside of the ruling party that fought for the 
regime’s liberalisation by imposing strong political pressure.
in March 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo announced to the kMT’s central 
committee that the moment of leading the country to constitutional 
democracy had arrived. Consequently, he named a group of twelve cen-
tral committee permanent members, including liberals and conserva-
tives, to assess the situation and propose a strategy. in June, the group 
presented a six point program: carry out extensive elections to choose 
the central organs representatives, reform local governments, directly 
elect the governors and mayors of Taipei and kaohsiung, simplify na-
tional security laws, legalise the new civilian associations and political 
parties, strengthen public order and fortify the work of the party.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) –which was tolerated 
for some time– made its foundation public in september 28th, 1986. 
Even though, the ministry of justice pressed charges against it for 
violating Martial Law, the president mediated and lifted the Mar-
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tial Law. in addition, he allowed the political parties that abandoned 
the communism and Taiwan’s independency causes. The DPP car-
ried out its first congress in November and adopted a Party constitu-
tion which supported in its documents –in ambiguous language that 
would not upset the government even more– Taiwan’s self-determina-
tion and its return to the United Nations.(Clark, 2000). The DPP, still 
without legal recognition, participated in the legislative elections of 
December 6th, 1986, where 84 members of the Legislative Yuan and 
73 members of the National Assembly were elected. The DPP won 
21% of the votes. on July 15th, 1987, Martial Law was suspended and 
on october 14th Taipei allowed family visits to the mainland for the 
first time. 
After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, on January 13th, 1988, the vice-
president, Lee Teng-hui2, rose to the presidency. Lee, as the first presi-
dent born in Taiwan, started a ‘taiwanisation’ process within the gov-
ernment and proceeded to immediately dismantle the old structure of 
the state, brought by Chiang kai-shek directly from China. Therefore, 
on March 2nd, 1988, the National security Council requested the vol-
untary retirement of the members of the parliament elected on the 
continent during the 40’s.
Along with this taiwanisation process of the government, Lee Teng-
hui started extending democratic liberties. Thus on January 20th, 1989, 
more political parties were allowed, and on December 2nd –that same 
year– they were able to stand in the elections for the Legislative Yuan, 
the Provincial Assembly of Taiwan, Taipei’s and kaohsiung’s Munici-
pal Councils, and County Magistrates and Town Majors. The DPP won 
35% of the votes and the kMT 60%. The National Assembly elected Lee 
Teng-hui president for a six-year term on March 21st, 1990.
The pressure for more reforms was expressed in mass meetings 
and President Lee decided to search for consensus among the is-
land’s different groups; so, in the summer of 1990 he called a confer-
ence on national issues, where the leadership of the kMT and the 
opposition achieved an agreement. During the conference the most 
important aspects on democratization were discussed, and the par-
ticipants reached a consensus on the necessity of a political reform. 
Consequently, in April 1991, a constitutional reform cancelling some 
National Assembly prerogatives was carried out. An organisation 
devoted specifically to deal with Mainland related issues was also 
constituted. The same year, on December 21st, the elections for the 
National Assembly took place; the DPP obtained 24% of the votes 
2 Mayor of Taipei 1978-1981, Governor of Taiwan Province 1981-1984, and Vice 
President since 1984.
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and the kMT 71%. on December 31st, 1991, every Mainland-elected 
member of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Yuan 
of Control finally retired.
since 1991, the Constitution has been amended several times with 
the purpose of changing some foundations of the government struc-
ture and the electoral mechanisms. The acting periods of both the 
president and the members of the National Assembly were reduced 
from six to four years; the proportional representation was introduced 
in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly also. The president 
and the vice-president could be elected by direct popular vote instead 
of being elected indirectly. The president with the approval of the Leg-
islative Yuan instead named the members of the Yuan of Control, that 
used to be elected by the Provincial Assemblies and the Municipal 
Councils, so this organism was transformed into a semi-judicial insti-
tution. Moreover, on June 7, 2005, the National Assembly was finally 
abolished by a constitutional amendment. 
All these reforms implied a redefinition of relations with China. 
The new ascending Taiwanese elite wanted to abandon the reunifica-
tion project and began constructing an all-Taiwanese political struc-
ture and a new form of nationalism. At the same time, informal chan-
nels of communication with the continent were open; travel, telephony 
communication, and triangular commerce increased. At the moment, 
the intensification of the economic relationship has made the island 
highly dependent on its commerce with the continent. 
it is important to emphasise that the opening process was not 
only a product of the island’s domestic social forces but, also, of the 
relationship with China and the international context. China’s eco-
nomic reforms, initiated in the late 70’s, were already consolidated 
with a clear capitalist bias which, together with the dismantlement of 
the soviet Union in the early 90s, made the phantom of communism 
vanish. For the kMT the only recognised enemy had been the Com-
munist Party, hence the island’s economic prosperity, the success of 
anticommunist education and the rise of a particular society, were the 
reason why the kMT did not see a threat in the domestic opposition 
forces. besides, the extreme isolation of the island after the shift of the 
American diplomatic recognition, convinced the kMT leadership to 
undertake the political opening to assure some international legitima-
cy, especially because in the 80’s it was already clear that the Chinese 
Communist Party wouldn’t choose the political opening.
simultaneously with the creation of political parties, the con-
tained elements of a highly educated civil society began to be ex-
pressed in publications and in the formation of new social organisa-
tions out of the kMT’s control. (hu, 1994:479, 481, 485-6) Likewise, in 
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January 1994, the Law of Universities granted to those communities 
a bigger participation in the management of their own issues.
Another remarkable element of Taiwanese society is the civil or-
ganisations or foundations devoted to the achievement of community 
goals. Many of them played an important role during the Martial Law 
period; however, their independence was questionable. over time, 
those foundations acquired a bigger role and began following their 
own objectives, aside from the state. (hsiao, 1994, pp. 393-399) Most 
of those foundations are oriented to philanthropy, education or cul-
ture and only 3.6% of them are devoted to social activism; most of 
them are privately financed and depend neither on government nor 
on big corporations.
The foreign educated Taiwanese play an important role in the 
political transformation. in Taiwan, until the 80’s, the tendency was 
to send students abroad, mostly to the United states, to specialise in 
post-graduate studies. At the beginning the return rate of those stu-
dents wasn’t very high, due to the economy’s incapacity to incorporate 
them. (Liu, 1981) since the 90’s, however, the return of highly quali-
fied personnel grew dramatically because of the country’s improved 
conditions, such as better salaries, political liberties and a special in-
centive system created by the Commission for the Youth. 
Elections and political parties
The transition from an only party dictatorship to an electoral democ-
racy in Taiwan initiated when the DPP managed to participate in the 
1986’s legislative elections. Therefore the consolidation of this process 
has been parallel with free trustworthy elections and the strengthen-
ing of the parties. it was Lee Teng-hui who organised the first direct 
presidential elections in 1996, where Lee Teng-hui himself won with 
54% of the votes. The most important highlight of this transition, 
though, is the second direct presidential election, on March 18th, 2000. 
For the first time, the elections were very hard-fought and also they 
were characterised by splits in the two most important parties. Five 
candidates contended for the presidency.
Lee Teng-hui imposed Lien Chan, the regime’s vice-president, who 
represented the continuity option, as the kuomintang candidate; nev-
ertheless Lien tried to put some distance from Lee’s radical positions 
on the state/state relation formula with China, that irritated beijing 
in July, 1999. The candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party was 
Chen shuibian, who was born in Taiwan from a poor peasant’s fam-
ily and was known for his inflexible position against corruption. he 
dragged along throughout his whole campaign the burden of his par-
ty’s radical posture on Taiwan’s independence, this implied the support 
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of the Taiwanese population which preferred independence, but also 
brought to him beijing’s menaces. James soong, a former prominent 
member of the kuomingtang, decided to run as an independent candi-
date in November 1999, as a response to the authoritarian imposition 
of the president’s candidate in his party. Regarding the China issue, 
he represented the position of the so-called Mainlanders, that is to 
say the most favourable for beijing. These three were the most voted 
candidates, but also running was Li Ao, a leading intellectual from the 
New Party –an earlier kuomingtang split–, who surprisingly called on 
his followers to vote for Lien Chan; and hsu hsin-liang, who ran for a 
little group that had broken away from the DPP.
During the electoral process, it was difficult to predict who of the 
three strongest candidates would win the elections; the polls gave very 
similar figures. in general, the three government options didn’t differ 
substantially from an ideological point of view or on their propos-
als on Taiwan’s economic and social development. Two elements ap-
peared as the most important issues during the campaigns, the rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China and the criticism against 
corruption; it seems however, that among the citizens the candidates’ 
background and personality were more relevant. This element, which 
can lead to the citizen’s preference for charismatic leaderships, may 
be very important in the dawn of a democratic system.
surprisingly for the ruling party, the election results were very un-
favourable. Chen shui-bian, for the DPP, obtained 39.3% of the votes, 
James soong 36.84% and Lien Chan from the kMT 23.1%. This meant 
a crushing defeat for the koumingtang, not only in quantitative terms 
but also for the certainty that they had put on winning the elections no 
matter what. still, when we consider the ideological affinities and the 
common origins of the losing candidates and add up their votes, we 
can observe a clear social tendency akin to kMT propositions.
Many elements explain the success of the Democratic Progressive 
Party’s formula, Chen shui-bian to the presidency and Anette Lu to 
vice-presidency. First, we have to consider that they were helped by the 
kMT’s break up and the attacks between the two candidates, Lien and 
soong, who each considered themselves as the great and only contend-
er. That dispute only served to expose the past government corruption, 
because Lien Chan was the vice-president and soong had been the first 
and last directly elected governor of the Taiwan province (1994-1998), 
making their mutual attacks based upon their respective administra-
tion’s flaws. As for Chen and Lu, they were leaders emerging from the 
civilian struggle for political rights in their own party. The fact that 48 
year old Chen came from a poor peasant family already marked a dis-
tance from the old political elite. besides what was important for voters 
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was his well-known inflexibility –as Taipei mayor– in the fight against 
corruption, the system of privileges and the administrative inefficiency. 
All of this was very appealing for a highly educated Taiwanese society, 
which no longer believed in promises and coercion –old kuomintang 
techniques. 55-year-old Anette Lu, was formed in the feminist struggles 
of the 70’s, she was imprisoned for fighting for human rights and is 
very popular among the female population.
it is difficult to judge the relevance for the elections of the tradition-
al Democratic Progressive Party posture on Taiwanese independence. 
China tried to influence the elections by different means; on February 
21st, the beijing government published the White Paper on the Taiwan 
issue, in a very threatening tenor, where a new condition justifying the 
use of force against Taiwan was added: the “indefinite delay on the con-
versations about reunification”. besides, the Chinese leaders’ harsh dec-
larations on the possibility of the use of force were given great publicity. 
obviously, this affected the Taiwanese society since, despite government 
intervention; Taipei stock Exchange’s Taiex index lost 7.1% in the week 
prior to the elections. This could have also influenced the surprisingly 
high number of votes for James soong, who represented the most mod-
erate position about China. After the publishing of the aforementioned 
White Paper, the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan conducted a poll 
demonstrating that the publication had had the opposite desired effect.
it seems that this crucial issue wasn’t determining as the con-
tenders didn’t show radically different positions regarding China. The 
following factors were the ones deciding the election in Chen’s favour: 
first, the kMT’s division and the focusing of the old party’s campaign 
against its former affiliated, James soong; second –but not necessarily 
less relevant–, the vote for change. Also important were Chen’s and his 
partner Anette Lu’s personal characteristics, the Democratic Progres-
sive Party’s promises of fighting corruption and the public support to 
Chen by some businessmen.
Decisively, those elections were crucial for Taiwan. on the one 
hand, they offered the chance to test relations with China of the new 
Taiwanese nationalist elite that has proved to be less radical than Lee 
Teng-hui, and on the other hand it has led to a readjustment of the 
political forces. This last process began with James soong’s departure 
from the kuomintang and his unexpectedly high number of votes. be-
sides, when the electoral results were known the kMT militants organ-
ised protests, some of them violent, to demand Lee Teng-hui’s resigna-
tion from the party’s presidency and his recognition of responsibility 
for defeat. Lien Chan resigned from the kuomintang vice-presidency 
and later on Lee Teng-hui resigned from the party presidency, which 
didn’t satisfy his angry party fellows.
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The kuomintang immediately undertook a self-criticism process 
and a structural reform. in the provisional meeting of the 15th Con-
gress of the Party, three months after the elections, Lien Chan was 
elected president and he nominated five new party’s vice-presidents, 
including a woman. subsequently, in the fourth plenary session of the 
15th Central Committee, 31 new members of the standing committee 
were elected; none of them was imposed from above. Moreover, the 
party’s constitution was reviewed and the direct election of the future 
president by all party members was introduced.
immediately after the elections, soong’s followers insisted him to 
create a new party. This is the reason why he founded the People First 
Party (PFP), which won over many kMT and New Party legislatives, 
becoming the Legislative Yuan’s third force.
Despite its reforming attempts, the kMT drowned in a new crisis 
after loosing the 2000 presidential elections. it was not only affected 
by the strong division of James soong’s departure and the foundation 
of a new party, but also by the new government’s fight against cor-
ruption that has revealed many details on the kMT members corrup-
tion, which was no surprise to anybody, but hadn’t been cleared up. 
besides, in the December 1st, 2001 legislative elections it was defeated 
again by the DPP, which led kMT to establish alliances with James 
soong’s party. 
in the 2004 presidential elections, the kMT lost again. however, 
the narrow margin giving triumph to the DPP –0.22 percent– and the 
severe accusations against the winning party and its candidate for the 
suspicious financing of their campaign which caused a serious dis-
credit to the DPP in its second period, have created an advantageous 
situation for the kMT which recovered its large share of votes in De-
cember 2005 local elections. This party’s recovery is due considerably 
to the continuous corruption scandals surrounding the DPP, which in 
its second period in government has succumbed to some corruption 
practices that were the kMT’s prerogative in the past. Also important 
in this recovery has been the charismatic leadership of Ma Ying-jeou, 
the Taipei mayor. At the end of June 2006, the kMT and the PFP tried 
to pass a motion in congress to organise a referendum to recall Presi-
dent Chen shui-bian amid a swirl of corruption scandals embroiling 
his wife and son-in-law. 119 of the legislature’s 221 members, well be-
low the two-thirds majority needed to force a referendum, backed the 
motion. The strong opposition in the congress has practically para-
lysed many actions in Chen’s government. besides, the kMT leaders 
have reached an important approach with China, at a time when this 
country was approving laws that set up its intention of making a mili-
tary intervention on the island if it declares independence. 
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on November 3, 2006, Wu shu-chen, President Chen shui-bi-
an’s wife, and threee other high-ranking officials of the Presidential 
office were indicted of corruption. Consequently, even prominent 
members of DPP have criticized the President. since the beginning 
of that year a prominent leader of DPP, shih Ming-de, has been in 
open opposition to the President Chen. in september he launched a 
campaign called “Million voices against corruption. President Chen 
must go”. Tens of thousands of people demonstrated in the streets 
wearing a red shirt asking for the resignation of the President. This 
movement, supported by the kMT, maintain a sitting on the Main 
Train station of Taipei, every day from 6 to 10 pm, asking for the 
resignation of the president. 
Taiwanese Society and Its Political Process
one element characterising Taiwanese society is its dynamic class 
mobility, as a product of development and economic opportunities. 
The general conditions encouraged by the state that have helped this 
social dynamism consist of efficient land reform, strong investment 
in education, industrial development and infrastructure construction. 
An interesting factor bearing upon social mobility is occupational 
crossing; many corporate employees have also small family assem-
blage companies that subcontract with big corporations. in the same 
way, because of its high level of information, people take advantage of 
the financial offerings so their savings grow fast with highly profitable 
investments.
All these elements have contributed to achieve a relatively fair 
income distribution that gives a sense of being constantly improved. 
however, due to the companies’ internationalisation and the invest-
ments placed abroad, when it is expressed in technical figures, this 
fair distribution reflects a different situation. During the initial period 
of social transformation and accelerated economic development, the 
income disproportion dramatically decreased because of the land re-
form in the 50’s. Nonetheless, the economic transformation toward 
bigger capital investment and technology exports, initiated in the 80’s, 
has –marginally– increased inequalities. in 1953, the Gini Coefficient 
was 0.56, by 1964 it decreased to 0.33 and by 1970 to 0.30. Later on, 
the Gini Coefficient increased, from 0.277 in 1980 to 0.316 in 1993, 
which is not directly perceived by the population for it is a reflect of 
economic internationalisation.
This situation, combined with other social traits, has prevented 
severe class conflicts on the island. The economy’s ‘family factor’, is 
another social element –hard to measure– that has also avoided em-
ployer-worker conflicts. A great portion of small and medium size 
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companies sustaining the island’s economy were family businesses 
employing preferably relatives and other people close to the family. 
Likewise, from the mid 60’s to the mid 80’s, the demand of work ex-
ceeded the supply, which forced businessmen to improve the working 
conditions to attract possible employees.
Until the end of the Martial Law in 1987, kuomintang exerted 
a corporative control over labour and it repressed every class con-
flict led by workers. Unions were utilised as a means of control rather 
than serving to protect the workers’ interests. This has changed and 
several independent unions, along with public manifestations and la-
bour disputes have emerged since 1987. Nevertheless, the workers’ 
movement is not an important political player because of the lack of 
severe economic contradictions, the existence of real options for in-
creasing income and the people’s tendency to combine different eco-
nomic activities. it is also essential to consider that the kuomintang 
–which held the government until May 2000– took political measures 
to provide social welfare, as well as redistribution policies wich took 
over some goals of the unionists. The party’s corporative tendency also 
reached out to the business sectors; by means of state/private com-
pany joint investments, and by using regulations and its fiscal power, 
the kuomintang with its political power controlled the most impor-
tant businessmen. This tendency changed with Lee Teng-hui’s regime, 
which allowed important businessmen, many of them of Taiwanese 
origin, to reach political power; and through different ways they have 
occupied legislative positions, a phenomenon that is not without its 
corruption accusations.
in general, we could distinguish Taiwanese society for its middle 
class predominance. it is composed of small and medium size busi-
nessmen, intellectuals, technicians, administrative workers of every 
level, et cetera. Due to the dramatic economical and political changes 
on the island, we can consider it mostly a second-generation middle 
class, characterised by a liberal political positioning, the supporting 
of democratisation and an open attitude toward the mixing of their 
different groups of origin.
From the social structure perspective, the most important cleav-
age that we can find on the island –for its complexity– is probably the 
one dividing the “Taiwanese” from the “Mainlanders”. it is an inherited 
identity, and it tends to dissolve. This division refers to people that ar-
rived to the island before 1945, and to their descendents; but most of 
them share a common origin and the same culture. Their difference 
lies in the fact that Taiwanese lived under Japanese rule for about 50 
years, while mainlanders arrived later to the island and settled in as a 
political class, monopolising key positions in the state structure, in the 
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ruling party and in educational and cultural institutions. They imposed 
things such as the Mandarin Chinese as the spoken language, or even 
a national concept based on a government that, in theory, controlled 
the whole of the Chinese territory. Another important event that con-
tributed to widen this division was the repression against the people 
opposing the occupation troops, which led to the massacre of about 
20,000 people on February 18th, 1947. This event is still remembered on 
the island and is the symbolic axe of a Taiwanese identity “oppressed” 
by the mainlanders. it is estimated that by the time of their arrival, 
the mainlanders –including administrative workers, military person-
nel and political refugees– were about one and a half million people; 
almost 20 % of the island’s population in 1949. by the mid 60’s they 
represented 15% of the island’s total population –probably 30% of the 
people living in urban areas. Nowadays, the estimation is that they 
amount to slightly over 10% of the population.
Regarding the work division, the separation can be expressed in 
the following way: relying on family labour and land possession, Tai-
wanese focused on productive activities, while –as we said before– 
Mainlanders, in general, occupied the state’s and the Party’s adminis-
trative positions as well as the management of new companies, settled 
on the island thanks to the state support and foreign investment3.
historically, these social boundaries have been expressed in the 
principal political parties, and they are still a fundamental issue in 
new political associations. Mainlanders kept their prominence in the 
kuomintang as the DPP have assumed the cause of Taiwanese vindica-
tion; so Taiwanese represent the majority of its leaders and its follow-
ers. it explains why a Taiwanese president of the kuomintang was such 
an important element on the structural change of these groups’ rela-
tions. The Mainland sectors inside the kMT that think that they have 
been left out by their leaders, founded another party in 1993, the New 
Party, which keeps a detailed proposal for trans-strait relations on its 
program platform and, moreover, its members pursue associations with 
the continent. The identity issue was also behind the foundation of the 
Taiwan solidarity Union Party, in August 2000, which states in its plat-
form the trans-strait relations as one of its main political concerns. This 
party grouped the kMT dissidents –who observed, after the electoral 
defeat, a change of direction on the taiwanisation tendencies imposed 
3 besides this division, it could be added that Taiwanese establish some group dis-
tinctions between the hokkien –representing the majority– and the hakka; though 
they both come from regions of the same province of Fujian. Likewise, they make 
a difference between the people coming from Guangdong province. These groups 
present notorious linguistic differences.
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by Lee Teng-hui–, and also some of the DPP dissidents –disappointed by 
president Chen shui-bian’s moderate policy towards China.
From my observation, in spite of the basis of this social division 
being rather weak, it is present in almost every group. it is a division 
encouraged by DPP as a way to present it self as a real alternative to 
kMT. Moreover, for many people it is a way to express their remorse 
for decades of repressive government of kMT. in other words, the so-
cial trauma of the repressive kMT government has been channelled to 
this “social division”. Contrary to other cases, the repressors have not 
rendered judgment. 
Taiwan Democracy’s Lessons
The DPP’s victory over the kuomintang, in the presidential elections 
of 2000, brought a regime shift that was confirmed the following year, 
when the kMT lost its majority in the congress. Although this has ful-
filled the expectations on the democratic transition of those prioritis-
ing the change of party in government, there are still some elements 
of the political system that can be considered problematic for the con-
solidation of democracy in Taiwan.
The state structure inherited a very close bond between the 
executive and the legislative powers as a by-product of a long peri-
od of a single-party administration. The DPP’s government agenda 
has suffered some paralysis due to the opposition alliances in the 
Legislative Yuan that often frustrate their actions. This has shown 
the necessity for some political reforms and constitutional amend-
ments allowing a definition of the political system towards a new 
one –perhaps one that, structurally, gives more prominence to the 
president; the kMT has systematically opposed this. on the other 
hand, inside the DPP, some disagree with the fact of having the 
president as the head of his own party, while others praise the sys-
tem’s advantages for building more cohesive action in the congress. 
The conflict between executive and legislative powers not only cre-
ates economic and administrative paralyses, but it also affects the 
prestige and significance of democracy as an efficient political sys-
tem among social sectors such as entrepreneurs and the like. The 
political elites from all parties do not consider the consequences of 
this issue on their agendas.
While in the past the core problems of the local elections were 
traditional local loyalties and vote buying, Taiwan has now entered 
a corruption wipeout process. The problem today is the way political 
parties are considering local election processes. For many of them 
these elections are only important in terms of people’s preferences to-
ward the next national elections, especially the presidential election, 
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without considering that local elections may play an important role in 
the political education of citizens in new democratic systems.
There is a growing lack of trust in political parties, which is ex-
pressed in a growing number of candidates independently running for 
elections. Frequently, political party campaigns are based on a series 
of corruption scandals or on the personal features of the candidates. 
Quite often ideological considerations are neglected in order to facili-
tate inter-party alliances otherwise impossible. small political parties 
usually “sell” or exchange voters’ preferences to negotiate and ensure 
political positions with big parties. All these abnormalities along with 
the frequency of election processes have brought a sort of “political fa-
tigue syndrome” among voters, which could in the future be expressed 
by staying away from ballot boxes. it can also be expressed by looking 
for charismatic leadership outside political parties, a person who may 
not always have a strong commitment to democracy. 
it is relevant also to consider the importance of the role played by 
the media along with the influences of local factions and interpersonal 
relationship networks and their effects in new democracies’ political cul-
ture. in a situation where candidates and parties are only looking for 
votes, they tend to sell themselves as any other commodity. Consequently, 
a kind of show business has become part of this new “pop electoral cul-
ture”. Therefore, expensive and efficient campaigns can result into cata-
pulting not precisely the best candidates to power, while the scandal-hun-
gry media avoids debating the important issues for communities.
There is a strong tendency to “personalize” leadership. influential 
leaders usually abandon parties when they do not obtain the nomination 
they seek. Then they run as independent contenders or establish a new 
small party to be able to negotiate with bigger organizations. As a result, 
voters have to choose from a number of parties or candidates offering 
similar ideologies and platforms. They usually end up voting for the most 
charismatic candidate or supporting whichever party seems stronger. 
Considering the case of Taiwan, i can conclude, that democracy is 
more than copying procedures and institutions. The political culture is 
particularly important, new democracies still need to go through po-
litical education in order to create real citizenship. The role of political 
parties in this process is crucial. however, political parties focused only 
on votes seem to neglect their role in political education. This situation 
tends to undermine the prestige and significance of democracy in socie-
ties where authoritarianism is not so far away historically speaking. 
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